IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF CENTRAL NORTH CAROLINA,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:11CV531

* Winston-Salem, North Carolina

VS.

LANIER CANSLER, in his official capacity as the Secretary of the North Carolina Department of

* August 10, 2011 10 a.m.

Health and Human Services,

Defendant. *******

> TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAMES A. BEATY, JR., UNITED STATES CHIEF DISTRICT JUDGE.

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff: PAUL R.Q. WOLFSON, ESQUIRE

JOSHUA M. SALZMAN, ESQUIRE Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale

and Dorr, LLP

1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20006

M. JACKSON NICHOLS, ESQUIRE

Allen & Pinnix, PA

Post Office Drawer 1270

Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

For the Defendant: MABEL Y. BULLOCK, ESQUIRE

NC Department of Justice

Post Office Box 629

Raleigh, North Carolina 27602

Lori Russell, RMR, CRR Court Reporter:

P.O. Box 20593

Winston-Salem, North Carolina 27120

Proceedings recorded by stenotype reporter. Transcript produced by Computer-Aided Transcription.

PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: The matter now being called for hearing is entitled Planned Parenthood of Central North Carolina versus Lanier Cansler.

If the parties will identify yourselves for the record.

MR. WOLFSON: Good morning, Your Honor. Thank you. My name is Paul Wolfson, appearing for the Plaintiff in this matter; and with me at counsel table are Mr. Jack Nichols and Mr. Joshua Salzman.

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. BULLOCK: Your Honor, my name is Mabel
Bullock. I'm with the public health section of the Attorney
General's office and I'm representing Defendant Cansler.

THE COURT: All right. It's the Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction. I'll hear from you.

MR. WOLFSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

This case involves one of several statutes that have recently been enacted across the nation in which state legislatures have barred funding for Planned Parenthood because of that organization's prominence as a pro-choice advocate and for its provision of abortion services. Two District Courts have already enjoined such legislation.

And this law in some ways is the worst of all because in this case the North Carolina Legislature has abandoned any pretense of following any neutral principle at all and

has simply singled out Planned Parenthood by name and has directed the State health department to deny all funds, all contracts, and grants to Planned Parenthood. This kind of categorical disqualification is a foreigner to our legal system and it violates both the Constitution and Title X.

Until the day that Section 10.19 was enacted, Planned Parenthood of Central North Carolina was a valued partner with the State health department in providing much needed, vital health services to vulnerable sectors in the community in North Carolina. The State had funded several projects run by Planned Parenthood and had showed every intention of renewing contracts with Planned Parenthood in this fiscal year.

What I -- and I'd like to focus on -- there are three projects at issue in this case; and for the moment, I'd like to focus on one of those projects to show the Court why there would be irreparable harm in the absence of a preliminary injunction.

One of the grants at issue in this case was a \$125,000 grant made available from federal funds provided through the Title X program that the State health department administers. That fund — those funds were to go to a Latino outreach and services project operated out of Planned Parenthood's Durham clinic. The State had all — the — Planned Parenthood had run this project in previous years.

The State had already told Planned Parenthood that the contract would be renewed for the coming year. Indeed, it had tendered to Planned Parenthood a contract, which my client had signed and returned to the State health department.

Before Section 10.19 was enacted, there was every indication that the State was going to renew its contract for that grant and, indeed, for the two other grants that are at issue in this case. The only reason that that contract was not renewed was because Section 10.19 was enacted and singled out Planned Parenthood by name as being ineligible for any grants or contracts run by the department of health services.

Now, I think it's important to understand that those were -- these are competitive contracts. So Planned Parenthood had applied for these grants and had come out first in the process -- in the competitive contracting process.

THE COURT: Were these solely Title X funds?

MR. WOLFSON: No for both also. There are three pools of money we're talking about. So there's the Title X funds, which are the Latino project from the Durham clinic. That's \$125,000.

Then there is a second pool of money which is used in Cumberland County which -- in a teen pregnancy prevention

education initiative and then -- so that's -- that's not Title X funds. Those are State funds. So there's no question of Planned Parenthood going to the federal government and asking for that money separately. And then -- so that's \$75,000.

And then there is a third grant, which is a grant for providing long-acting contraceptives to lower income women. That's also a separate pool of money. That's just State money, not Title X funds.

So essentially all of those —— all of those programs will have to be shut down by Planned Parenthood. The —— the —— Planned Parenthood has already shut down the program for providing —— the women's health grant for providing long-acting contraceptives, and if the funding —— if the law is not enjoined and the funding is not restored —— for the past month and a half Planned Parenthood has been dipping into its reserves to make sure these programs can keep going, but that has to come to an end very soon. And so these programs will be shut down within a few weeks and inevitably that will mean, you know, laying off staff, terminating —— curtailing services; and probably Planned Parenthood will be forced to close its Durham clinic entirely because that —

THE COURT: Are services available through other entities?

MR. WOLFSON: Well, the -- the State has not indicated that the services are available through other entities. There are -- the county health department does offer various kinds of services to people in Durham County; but as we pointed out in our affidavit, one of the things that Planned Parenthood can offer people is -- first of all, it has -- all of its clinicians at the Durham clinic are bilingual. So it can -- given that this is a -- it's a heavily Latino community in the area -- and indeed, of course, one of the grants is directed for Latinos -- that's obviously a very important thing. The county health department does not have that -- does not have a fully bilingual staff, so interpreters may be needed. That's, I think, very important.

We are able to offer services on a -- virtually on a walk-in basis. At the county health department, there are sometimes wait times of weeks and indeed months for various kinds of services. Of course, when you're talking about women's health, these can be matters that are -- really need to be addressed on an urgent, real-time basis. We are able to offer weekend hours and some weekday hours late, you know, into the evening. So these are all things that the county health department cannot offer.

And then if we -- if we really did have to close the Durham clinic entirely, which seems likely, we're talking

about -- that clinic sees about 3,000 patients a year -- 3,000 unique patients a year. That's running up to about 7,000 visits from 3,000 unique patients; and, you know, the State has not suggested that the county health department will be able to absorb all of those patients, certainly not in a way where they could be seen on a timely basis.

So not only is there irreparable harm to Planned
Parenthood from having to curtail its operations and having
to shut down the clinic, but I think there's a very serious
public interest issue here, which is, of course, the fourth
prong of the preliminary injunction standard, which is will
the public interest be served by essentially freezing the
status quo before, which was that we were going to get the
contracts and the funding.

Now, the State has suggested that we can go to the federal government for funding. First of all, that's not the case for two of the programs that I spoke about.

THE COURT: And you're speaking of making a direct grant -- seeking a direct grant from the federal government.

MR. WOLFSON: Correct.

First of all, that's just not true about two of the programs, the teen pregnancy program and the long-acting contraceptive program. And for the other program, one of the crucial problems with that argument is that these funds are -- you know, you have to apply for these funds well in

advance of the fiscal year. So the grants are made available on a fiscal-year cycle. So for the current fiscal year, which began July 1, the grant applications for that were due, you know, well -- I think in the late winter or early spring at some point. So time has passed for that. So we're not -- if we could -- if we even could apply to the federal government -- of course, there is no assurance the federal government would give us the money. If we could apply to the federal government, we couldn't even get that money until July of 2012.

In the meantime, we would have to shut down. Our patients would not have our services. We don't know where they would go. And even, theoretically, if we could ramp up later having gotten the money — you know, in healthcare there's a very serious issue with continuity of care. I mean, we lose the — you know, part of our objective here is reaching out to the community and letting them know that these services are available. If that disappears, you know, I don't know that we'll be able to kind of re — it will be difficult to reinvent all of that later on having lost our contacts with all the various people who refer and the entities and the community groups that refer patients to our clinic. And indeed the State has not suggested that other entities will actually have — really do have the capacity to be able to step into the breach and replicate the

services that we have provided for, you know, several years up until now.

The -- I've spoken to the -- I've spoken to the -- the inability to reach out for the federal funds, to our having to curtail services imminently, to having to close the Durham clinic with a loss of services and a loss of -- obviously, having to lay off our staff. We don't know that we would be able to get back our staff even if we would be able to get the funding later and ramp up the program again, though that -- that is, I think, the key point on the irreparable harm that would befall Planned Parenthood in the absence of an injunction.

Turning to the likelihood of success on the merits, the State has provided no legitimate justification for its decision to disqualify Planned Parenthood and only Planned Parenthood from state and federal funding. Indeed, I think what's most notable by the State's brief is what it does not say. It does not argue that there has been any complaint about the quality of our services. It does not argue that there is any evidence that we have engaged in any financial irresponsibility or any program integrity problems. Indeed, as I've spoken, the State was all prepared to renew its contracts with us. It does not argue that Section 10.19 is a budgetary or a cost-saving measure and indeed it's not.

The -- the legislature's intent, presumably, was that

the money go to other programs and, of course, for -- this is money -- the Title X funds are the money that the State gets from the federal government. So it has to spend that money. It can't just pocket it. And most notably, the State, I think to its credit, has not even -- could not even bring itself to defend what was said in the legislative history, especially in the House of Representatives, about the justification for Section 10.19. As the Court is aware, the -- the interest that was offered in the House of Representatives, both in the committee and on the floor, for Section 10.19 was that Planned Parenthood was an unsavory organization because of the past history of its founder, Margaret Sanger, with the eugenics movement.

You know, there are so many problems with it that I can't even -- you know, it's hard to know where to begin other than the fact that, you know, that -- the comments that were made were 80 years ago when this organization in North Carolina wasn't even in existence. It has never been involved in the eugenics movement, et cetera, but I think -- I think to its credit the State has not even taken up that and accepted that that would be a justification because that is just a -- that is just a straight-out punishment of this organization for something that somebody affiliated with an affiliate of it did 80 years ago.

This is also not -- what's also not at issue here, this

is not a case where the State has decided, "We're going to fund certain activities and not other activities." So there's no question — we have no dispute with the principle that the State has discretion in deciding in its budgetary priorities that it's going to fund certain activities and not others.

THE COURT: So in each instance here where you've talked about the funding being involved, these are programs that the State would otherwise or is otherwise making funds available for, whether it's the Latino family planning program or the teen pregnancy program or the other contraceptive program you mentioned.

MR. WOLFSON: That is correct. These are activities that the State desires to fund and desires somebody to implement. So this is not — this is not a question that the State — this doesn't bring at all into question the principle that the State can decide where its budgetary priorities go. It also doesn't bring into question the principle that the State has averted to in its brief that the State can favor childbirth over abortion in deciding how to use its funds. The Supreme Court has —

THE COURT: In terms of putting any funds toward the issue.

MR. WOLFSON: Correct, correct.

The Supreme Court has said so. But what this is about,

this is about something else altogether. This is about the State saying, "We are not going to give you money, not because it would be — that money would be used for abortions but because you have engaged in abortion-related activities and speech elsewhere with your own money, on your own time, in other programs not funded by the State; that because we don't — we don't like that and we want to penalize that for — you for doing that we're just going to deny you funding here for a completely unrelated and indeed worthy activity," which is family planning, teen pregnancy.

THE COURT: What would be the objective? "If you don't do that" -- "if you don't abandon your activities, then we're not going to give you funding at all on programs that we will fund"?

MR. WOLFSON: Well, I don't know what the objective would be. I mean, of course, this is just a categorical ban. It says, "You may not have funding." I mean, they haven't given us the option of saying, "If you give up your abortions, you can get the money." But I don't think that that's -- you know, it's not a quid pro quo that the State has engaged in here. They've just basically said, "You" -- and one assumes it's because of "you," Planned Parenthood, and one has to assume it's because of what you've done previously -- "you may not get our money and federal money."

And indeed, Senator Daniel on the floor of the Senate said, you know, "I think this is a very legitimate bill that we have here because I would just like to point out the pregnant women who come to Planned Parenthood overwhelmingly choose to have abortions rather than, for example, to seek referral — rather than, for example, to have referral for adoption."

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Now, obviously, one can have the debate about abortion versus adoption and the moral issues, but that's not the issue here. The issue here is that providing abortion services is a constitutionally-protected activity and has been so recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court many times, and the North Carolina Legislature is not authorized within the confines of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to say to Planned Parenthood, "Because you engage in those constitutionally-protected activities we are deciding to put a mark on you and say that you are not entitled to our money." Even if it has nothing to do -- even if the money and the activity have nothing to do with abortion, even if the money is going to activities that we think are desirable, are important to the public health for communities in North Carolina, which I think -- indeed, the legislative history -- the defenders of the bill have said, "We're not taking" -- "We're not defunding this. We want to fund family planning. This is something we want to do.

We're not reducing the funding. So this is not a program we're not reducing funding for. We just don't want you to be involved in it."

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The -- this sort of concept that you can't penalize a person or an organization for engaging in constitutionally-protected activities, I think this goes back to the classic cases from the Supreme Court of the 1950s where the Court said that someone couldn't be denied a government job because they wouldn't take a loyalty oath or because they wouldn't disavow their sympathy for membership in certain organizations or certain movements which were disfavored at the time, maybe even disfavored today; but the Courts -- the Court understood that denying somebody a job, money, a benefit because they have engaged in constitutionally-protected activity has a powerful coercive effect, not just on that person but also on other people who are watching. It has a powerful coercive effect and the inevitable result is to abridge those constitutional freedoms just as forcefully as if you had a direct restraint on the constitutional protected act -- on the protected activity.

THE COURT: So speak to me about which portions of the constitution you think -- you say are at issue here.

MR. WOLFSON: Correct.

THE COURT: What's being violated?

MR. WOLFSON: So there are -- we rely on four provisions of the Constitution and I think it's useful to kind of separate them into two groups of two because I think they're -- although they're doctrinally different, they are -- the two and two can be thought of sort of raising similar issues.

What I have been speaking of mostly up until now has been the First Amendment, of course, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in particular the aspect of the Due Process Clause that has been held to guarantee the right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy. So one can talk of that as substantive due process but part of the liberty that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. So those are two separate kinds of constitutionally-protected activity, providing services to women who want to terminate their pregnancy and also speaking out in favor of reproductive choice that Planned Parenthood, of course, has long engaged in and is a very visible participant in, perhaps the most visible.

And I think the Court is aware that we provided the Court with the two other cases in Kansas and in Indiana where the legislatures have acted similarly. Of course, there was a big debate in the United States Congress earlier this year where very similar legislation was actually passed by the House of Representatives that would have just

completely defunded Planned Parenthood from federal funds. That did not survive the Senate, but I think we can see that these are all part of a movement that is afoot in legislatures and to penalize a particularly visible organization for having engaged in constitutionally-protected activity. Again, this is not an issue of the legislature choosing which activities it wants to fund out of its budget because the legislature has made clear that these activities, family planning and teen pregnancy prevention, are highly important, desirable activities that it's funding in full, just not by Planned Parenthood. So that's one set.

The second set of constitutional challenges that I haven't yet spoken to quite as much arise -- are the Bill of Attainder and the violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. And these are -- they are doctrinally distinct, but they are, I think -- they share similar concerns because they -- the concern there is that of all the entities in the world the legislature has just picked out one or one set of affiliated entities in Planned Parenthood and said, "You may not get federal funds." Or, sorry, state or federal funds.

The -- the Equal Protection Clause, there are several -- I think there are several aspects to our equal protection challenge here. The first is, as the Supreme

Court pointed out or held in the case of Romer versus Evans, when a legislature singles out a group of — a specifically identifiable group or entities, group of entities for disfavored treatment and where that singling out is not supported by a legitimate regulatory objective but appears designed — appears motivated out of animus, out of a bear desire to disfavor, that violates the Equal Protection Clause even at its lowest level of scrutiny, which is rational basis, because the bear desire to — the bear desire to inflict disapproval on a group without any other regulatory objective is not — it's just not even a legitimate governmental objective under the Fourteenth Amendment.

So another strand of our equal protection challenge is what is known as the "class of one" type of challenge, which is I think related, which is just you can't just single out one person or one entity without any rational basis for doing so. The State hasn't suggested that there is one.

And then, second, I think this case does implicate what is sometimes called the fundamental rights strand of equal protection, which is you can't discriminate against a group of people because they have engaged in fundamental rights.

And as I've spoken, obviously Planned Parenthood has frequently and vocally engaged in fundamental rights. This is a strand of equal protection that goes back to the

Supreme Court's cases where they decided that you couldn't discriminate against people with giving them public assistance because they recently moved into the state because they had engaged in their constitutional right to interstate travel. That's a constitutional right and you couldn't draw distinction based on that.

Here I think it's sort of the same problem. The distinction is being drawn — the line is being drawn, the circle is being drawn around Planned Parenthood and the target painted on it because it has engaged in constitutionally-protected activity and it's just motivated by a desire to penalize Planned Parenthood.

Turning to the Bill of Attainder, I think essentially this is -- for sort of similar reasons this is -- I mean, there are very few Bill of Attainder cases in the courts, reported cases; and I think the reason why is that this kind of action is just so fundamentally at odds with our legal system and principles that legislatures don't do it very often because they know that they -- that this is wrong. It is -- it is really unusual for --

THE COURT: It appears from a legislative history that this was brought to the attention of some of the sponsors of the 10.19.

MR. WOLFSON: Correct. That was -- the Bill of Attainder issue was raised on the floor, as it was -- as it

has been in other similar — other of these other similar laws and bills that I've pointed out; but it, obviously, did not prevail in the legislature.

But this is -- I mean, it's one thing for the legislature to say, "We're not going to give funds to a particular class of people because, you know, maybe you're not suitable for this kind of particular program." But for the legislature to actually kind of identify an organization by name and say, "Not you, "You can't get any government funds," "You can't participate in government contracts," "You're not eligible to help us carry out valuable services for the community," that is -- that is really extraordinary and happens -- fortunately, happens very rarely in our country.

I think the framers of the Constitution understood that from time to time in a democracy — and we have all the benefits of our democracy, which I'm very happy for. But from time to time in a democracy, the public does get roused by passions against particular people, groups, organizations. Fortunately, in our democracy, the passions usually subside, but sometimes they don't subside without leaving some devastation in their wake.

And this, I think, is an example because the -- the -- the Section 10.19 bears all the hallmarks of a legislature being roused to punish a particular organization for what it

has done in the past. Obviously, I've spoken to the comments made in the committee and on the floor about this being an appalling organization because the women get abortions instead of adoption referrals because of the supposed participation in the eugenics movement, which is a terrible blot on the North Carolina history but not something in which my organization had anything — my client had anything to do with. But the singling out for — essentially for vilification of a particular organization makes this — really bears this the hallmarks of punishment. The — and that, unfortunately, is what has happened in Section 10.19.

What is not present in Section 10.19 is the presence of a legitimate regulatory objective. So there are cases where the Courts have said, "Okay. You know, we're troubled by the fact that the legislature has identified a particular person or group or entity by name, but let's think about whether or let's examine whether maybe there might have been a legitimate nonpunitive reason for them to do so. For example, was this an organization that in the past had shown signs of fiscal impropriety? Was it an organization that in the past had failed to carry out the terms of the program in an effective way that the State intended? Were there concerns about that organization being committed to the program?"

THE COURT: If these were the reasons, they would not necessarily be for punishment purposes, but they're legitimate reasons.

MR. WOLFSON: Correct. Those would be legitimate purposes. Of course, none of them appear in the legislative history and the State has not advanced any of them here. The only — the only interests that the State has advanced are "We can choose childbirth over abortion," which is — is — it's true as a general matter, but — and in terms of where the State directs its funds, but that has nothing to do with this program. And the State has said, "Well, we're entitled to favor organizations that are pro—life rather than pro—choice in our funding decisions." But in this context, that is not a legitimate regulatory objective. I mean, this has — there's no match between that objective and the programs that are being funded here that Planned Parenthood was being asked to carry out.

So those -- those are the -- those are the set of concerns that are raised by the Equal Protection Clause and the Bill of Attainder by the singling out of Planned Parenthood.

Finally, I want to touch on the Supremacy Clause and Title X. I've left that for last because normally, of course, the Courts look to the nonconstitutional ground before they look to the constitutional ground in the hopes

of avoiding a constitutional problem. That, unfortunately, I think is not available to the Court here because only one of our claims involves Title X and Supremacy Clause, only the Title X funds, too, and not the others. So our constitutional claims go to all three and are only -- and are the only claims we have for two of the pools of -- two of the three pools of money that we spoke to. So that is why I started with the Constitution.

But -- let me say a few things. First of all, as the Fifth Circuit has most noticeably held in the Planned Parenthood versus Sanchez and as the recent cases in Kansas and Indiana have pointed out, Title X reflects Congress's judgment that funds be made available on the broadest possible array to every reach of the state, every community; and that is why Congress has said that any -- any nonprofit entity is eligible to apply for funds. And the State, by saying just there's a group of people we won't even let apply, the State has arti -- has -- that -- to use the language of implied preemption, that stands as an obstacle to Congress's objectives because it is narrowing the class of people and entities that would be --

THE COURT: Is that creating some additional criteria that Congress did not have?

MR. WOLFSON: Correct. Exactly.

Now, the State hasn't really denied that. I mean,

their responses have been, "Well, you can go to the federal government for money yourself," which I have spoken to. The other things they have said is, "Well this, can't be raised under Section 1983 because this isn't a right." We disagree with that, but I think the more important point is the Court does not have to decide that because the Court has authority just to entertain a Supremacy Clause challenge as sort of a direct cause of action for equitable -- we're talking about equitable relief, of course, not money damages.

But the -- we point to cases in our reply brief and the cases are legion going back to the 1820s where the federal courts have just heard -- before Section 1983 was even enacted, of course, which was after the Civil War -- where the courts have just -- the federal courts have just granted injunctions against state statutes that just conflict with a federal statute, and that sort of equitable authority arises under this Court's subject matter jurisdiction under 1331 and is properly before the Court without regard to whether Section 1983 also would provide the Court with the vehicle.

1983 might be important later on down the road or attorney's fees under 1988 or something like that, but there's no need for the Court to address that here.

And then, or course, finally, the State has addressed the Eleventh Amendment; and I think the Court will understand that this -- the Eleventh Amendment just is not

applicable here. This is a direct — this is a classic case under *Ex Parte Young* where we are suing a state officer for — essentially for acting ultra vires, for acting in a way that is illegal under federal statutory and constitutional law. We're not seeking retrospective money damages. We are asking for the Court to enjoin the enforcement of Section 10.19 here today. That is what we have asked for in our motion. It is our belief —

THE COURT: The Defendant makes the point that with respect to the contracts that you're asking for -- that your contract, if it existed at all, may have expired and you're asking for the injunction for ongoing contracts that are not even in existence, as they would argue.

MR. WOLFSON: Right. So it is our understanding -- I mean, Ms. Bullock may be able to speak to this, but from the record as we -- the factual record as we understand it, the -- the State was all -- was ready, able, and willing to enter into the contracts with us. Indeed, of course, as I said, they had tendered contracts to us, which we had signed and returned to them; and they had indicated to us that we had won the competitive grant process; and therefore, we were to get the contract and to get the money.

So the only reason that we have been -- we have been tendered for why that did not happen was the enactment of Section 10.19. So if that law is enjoined, it would seem to

me the natural course of events would be that the State would do what it had said it already would do, which is sign the contracts. It is -- we haven't -- we do not have any information that would indicate to us that those contracts -- that any other contracts have been let to anybody else or that the money has been obligated elsewhere. If that is the case, you know, we might ask the Court --

THE COURT: It's not in the record at this point.

MR. WOLFSON: It's not in the record at this point. I would say that, contrary to what happened in Kansas where the State said that had happened, the State has not said that has happened here. So they have not told the Court that "We've given that money to somebody else." So it would — it would appear to us that the status quo, as far as we can tell, is that the — if 10.19 is enjoined, the State should be ready to move forward with what it said it would do already.

THE COURT: There's some issue with respect to what's the status quo. The Defendant argues status quo is now that 10.19 has been enacted, so that's status quo. What's your response to that?

MR. WOLFSON: I think the status quo is the last -- what is the term -- uncontested situation between the parties; and the day before Section 10.19 was enacted the State had tendered -- had informed us that the contracts

would be renewed, had tendered the contracts to us. We had signed them and returned them to the State. So it would appear that -- and as I pointed out, again, this is a competitive grant process, so we won. So it would appear that there would be nothing left for the State to do but to finalize the contract and enter into their contractual relationship that it was previously prepared to do.

Unless the Court has any questions --

THE COURT: I'm sure the State is going to argue with respect to whether or not there's -- how the Court is to take into account balance of the equities -- you haven't talked about that very much -- as to how the State might be harmed as opposed -- or not harmed, as you may argue, as opposed to the Plaintiff.

MR. WOLFSON: Well, I don't -- I don't see how the State is harmed because the State was -- the status quo was the State was prepared to do exactly what we would like it to do, which is enter into a contractual relationship with us and give us -- and give us the grants.

I mean, as I said before, we -- we are a long-and-valued partner with the State department of health for close to a decade for carrying out these kinds of programs. I mean, the State -- I mean, to its credit, the State in its briefs has never said, "We" -- you know, "We did this because, you know, we, the health department, by

the way, we're dissatisfied with your performance." So, I mean, the State -- this is not a situation where the State would say, you know, "We didn't -- we didn't really like the way you were carrying out this program and we actually just think it would be better for somebody else to have -- have a shot at it." That would be something that would, obviously, be important to the State if that were true, but no suggestion has been offered that it is.

And, again, this is not -- we don't -- this is not a case here where the State health department said, totally independent of 10.19, "We're just not going to give you the contract this year. We're going to give it to somebody else." I mean, there we would have a different situation I think because the state might have an argument -- obviously, one would have to know more about the facts, but the State might have an argument that it would be harmed because somebody else would provide it with superior results.

But here, because we were the winners of the competitive contracting process and because the State had already indicated it was ready, willing, and able to contract with us, it's hard to see how the State is harmed. And, again, there's no budgetary impact. We're not asking the State to spend money that it wouldn't otherwise spend.

THE COURT: Thank you, sir.

MR. WOLFSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Ms. Bullock.

MS. BULLOCK: Your Honor, the various claims that the Plaintiff have brought in its complaint have already been brought up: Supremacy Clause, First Amendment, Due Process Clause, Equal Protection, Bill of Attainder.

I'll start off by saying there is no conflict between the federal law and 10.19 -- and Section 10.19. Does 10.19 as written prevent Planned Parenthood from receiving any funds administered by the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services? Yes, it does. Does it prevent Planned Parenthood from applying directly to the federal government for Title X family planning funding? No, it does not. Is the State the only place that Planned Parenthood can go to apply for Title X funding? No. Unlike Medicaid, the State is not the only source of Title X funding for the Plaintiff for family planning funding.

In their brief --

THE COURT: Are you speaking of prospectively or are you talking about the contracts that may have already been in existence in terms of the fiscal years?

MS. BULLOCK: Your Honor, what I'm saying is that Planned Parenthood has always had the ability to directly apply. They have chosen on their own, in their discretion to rely on being a delegate of the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services.

THE COURT: Well, North Carolina in making the 1 2 application included Planned Parenthood as one of the 3 service providers, didn't it? 4 MS. BULLOCK: What it indicated in its application 5 was a past history of what the previous year -- their record It did not say that their application was based on a 6 7 promise of providing funds to Planned Parenthood. 8 basically a history of what had gone on the previous year 9 for --10 THE COURT: And that was that Planned Parenthood 11 had provided these services that were subject to Title X 12 funding or could receive Title X funding. 13

MS. BULLOCK: I'm not sure that I understand.

THE COURT: In terms of including a reference to Planned Parenthood in the grant you were seeking from the federal government for Title X funds --

MS. BULLOCK: Yes, sir.

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THE COURT: -- they were mentioned to the extent they had been receiving Title X funds without any reason not to give them those funds.

MS. BULLOCK: It did not indicate any bad dealings with Planned Parenthood. It did not indicate any problems with them, but it did not indicate any promise that they would be part of the package deal if the federal government decided to give them the Title X funding because, again, the State has to apply for the funding. It's no guarantee to the State that they'll get the funds as a grantee, just as there's no guarantee that a delegate is going to get the funds.

THE COURT: But for the affected years, they did get the funding.

MS. BULLOCK: They have previously gotten the Title X funding from the State, yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: In terms of fiscal years, I believe the Plaintiff was speaking of for the 2011-2012 period the funding was already in place, \$125,000 for the Title X money, and there was some contract, perhaps, for the other services in Cumberland County or the contraceptive program.

MS. BULLOCK: A contract for this fiscal year had been discussed with Planned Parenthood. Contracts had been signed, but there was no execution of that contract. There is no contract in effect at this time.

THE COURT: And why not?

MS. BULLOCK: Because there was, as the Plaintiff has stated, 10.19; but because of that there was no new contract that was entered into. The budget bill passed in June to be effective July 1st. This lawsuit --

THE COURT: But you're saying but for 10.19, with the contracts already having been let, more than likely they would have received the funding?

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MS. BULLOCK: Your Honor, what I'm saying is, is that the contract that was in existence prior to June 30th has expired. It expired June 30th. This law took effect July 1st. The budget bill was passed June 15th. This lawsuit was not filed until July 7th. The status quo at that time was 10.19, no contract. And as far as what the Plaintiffs are asking this Court to do --THE COURT: Just for -- point of clarification. If you say June 30th is when the contracts expired, are you saying that the money in the contract that expired June 30th would have been for the previous year or was that for the upcoming fiscal period starting July 1, 2011? MS. BULLOCK: No, I'm saying the contract fiscal year July 1, 2010, to June 30th, 2011, expired June 30th. THE COURT: Is that what they're seeking to get at this point as a part of an injunction? MS. BULLOCK: No, Your Honor. They're seeking to obtain funding for the fiscal year July 1, 2011, through July -- June 30th of 2012. THE COURT: So is it correct they had a contract for that that Plaintiff had signed and returned to the State? MS. BULLOCK: Your Honor, our position is there is no contract unless it has been executed.

THE COURT: My question is: Is it correct that

they had a contract that they had returned to the State covering the period from July 1, 2011, to June --2 3 MS. BULLOCK: Yes, Your Honor. They had signed a 4 proposed contract, but it has not been executed. There is 5 no contract. 6 THE COURT: By the State. 7 MS. BULLOCK: Correct. 8 THE COURT: Thank you. 9 MS. BULLOCK: As far as the Plaintiff stating in 10 their brief that Planned Parenthood cannot obtain funds 11 directly from the government at least until next year is an 12 admission that it can apply for funding directly from the 13 federal government. They have made the choice, in their 14 discretion, not to do that; but because they haven't chose 15 to go directly to the federal government for the funding 16 does not make the action of 10.19 unconstitutional. 17 THE COURT: Again, though, you're talking about a 18 funding period that the application process, if they were 19 going for the 2012 to 2013 period, yes, as a part of this 20 year, 2011, they could have put in an application; but they 21 can't put any application in for monies for 2011-2012 22 because the period for that has run. 23 MS. BULLOCK: Yes, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: Thank you. 25 MS. BULLOCK: But as far as other Planned

Parenthood organizations in the United States, there are many that go directly to the federal government to get Title X funding for whatever reason. May it be that it's easier to have the funds administered through DHHS, this Planned Parenthood organization has chosen to go through the State and not go directly to the feds. That's their discretionary decision and that's what they chose to do. The funds are not guaranteed to any delegate application to the State of North Carolina.

As far as the First Amendment and Due Process claims that the Plaintiffs make, 10.19 does not impose a penalty on any constitutionally-protected right of the Plaintiff.

Therefore, there's no violation of the First or Fourteenth Amendments. Defendant Cansler maintains that the preference of the majority of the North Carolina General Assembly to prefer childbirth over abortion and not to provide funding for organizations that are pro-choice is a preference that the General Assembly is allowed to make. There is no constitutional right to the funds for family planning and the General Assembly can choose to fund such programs that it supports. Planned Parenthood --

THE COURT: But you're funding other organizations or would fund other organizations for the programs that are involved here. We're not talking about abortion here.

MS. BULLOCK: Title X funding does go to many

other entities, but none of those other entities provide 2 abortions. 3 THE COURT: So because they're using other funds other than Title X or other State funds through this 4 5 program -- because they otherwise use other funds for abortion, you're saying they can be prohibited by 10.19 in 6 7 this case from getting these funds and not related to abortion activities? 8 9 MS. BULLOCK: What I'm saying is 10.19 does nothing to affect their freedom of speech, does nothing to 10 11 affect their ability to give abortions, provide abortions. 12 It makes no restriction on that whatsoever. They are still 13 able to do that on their own accord. 14 THE COURT: But because they do they cannot 15 receive funding that's otherwise available to anybody that 16 wants to apply? 17 MS. BULLOCK: They are not able to have funds that 18 are administered by DHHS with the Title X funding or other 19 funds, but they can apply directly to the federal 20 government. 21 THE COURT: What makes them not eligible for those 22 department of health services funds from the State?

MS. BULLOCK: That is a policy decision that the

THE COURT: What is the reason? Tell me again.

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General Assembly made.

MS. BULLOCK: Because they favor childbirth over abortion, which is a position that the General Assembly can favor and support. Family planning funds, that's not a constitutional right. Nobody has a right --

THE COURT: Is there any portion of the funds from your argument that are related to the childbirth or abortion issue that are involved here as a part of the funding in this case?

MS. BULLOCK: Excuse me?

THE COURT: Are there any funds being used toward that decision or choice that you make reference to, pro-choice or abortion or life or abortions, any of the funds that are a part of these programs being used for that?

MS. BULLOCK: Title X funds cannot be used for abortion, but the General Assembly's position that it does not want to provide support to the entity that does provide abortions would be a policy that they can favor.

Again, the Plaintiff argues that 10.19 targets protected speech and protected conduct, and Defendant Cansler would argue that this is not accurate because there is nothing that -- as far as freedom of speech or any type of conduct that 10.19 would prohibit. Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to provide abortions and 10.19 does --

THE COURT: So you would suggest there is no

discriminatory aspect of 10.19? 1 2 MS. BULLOCK: I am stating that the position that 3 the General Assembly took does have a legitimate rational basis because they can favor childbirth over abortion. 4 5 THE COURT: So you're saying it does not have any 6 discriminatory purpose? 7 MS. BULLOCK: There is no penalty intended, no, 8 Your Honor. What is intended is that they want to support 9 programs that favor childbirth and not abortion, and the 10 defunding of Planned Parenthood does not --11 THE COURT: So if Planned Parenthood was seeking 12 funds from the General Assembly for abortions, then the 13 General Assembly certainly could prohibit that? 14 MS. BULLOCK: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Is that what they're seeking as a part 15 16 of what's involved in this case? 17 MS. BULLOCK: I'm sorry? 18 THE COURT: Are they seeking to get the monies in 19 this case from the Title X funding or the funds for the 20 statement at issue here, are they seeking to use those for 21 abortion purposes? 22 MS. BULLOCK: Is that what Planned Parenthood is 23 doing? 24 THE COURT: Yes. 25 MS. BULLOCK: Again, by federal and state law,

they're not allowed to use those funds for abortion. 2 THE COURT: But are they doing that? Is there any 3 suggestion they're doing that? MS. BULLOCK: There has been no allegations that 4 5 there has been misuse of funds by Planned Parenthood. 6 THE COURT: Okay. 7 MS. BULLOCK: But in defunding Planned Parenthood, 8 there is no restriction on a woman's means of access to 9 vital medical information and it does not represent an 10 impermissible limitation upon free speech. It simply does 11 not fund it. There has been no restriction on the actions 12 or the speech, and the patients still have the ability to 13 obtain access to medical information and free speech as 14 existed prior to the funding through the State administered 15 Title X funds. The State did not create the condition of 16 indigence that many patients have. It is not funding 17 Planned Parenthood. There is no government --18 THE COURT: It appears you're reading from your brief that I may have already read before. What distinction 19 20 do you make between this case and the facts that may have

MS. BULLOCK: In the Kansas and in the -- in Sanchez and in Indiana, there were various distinctions that can be made. In this particular case, there was no

existed leading to results in the Kansas or the Indiana

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case?

termination of an existing contract. They were the existing facts in several of the other cases because there were existing contracts that they were either -- in Sanchez, they were required to sign an affidavit saying they were going to give up the ability to do abortions in order to get the funds and there was an existing contract. There is no existing contract here.

And in the Indiana case, I believe one of the main pots of money or whatever that were involved there was Medicaid and with Medicaid you can only get that through the State, but here you can get Title X directly from the federal government.

So there are distinctions between those cases. I mean, they're very similar. I'm not going to deny that. But as far as the distinctions, there are many; and as far as the General Assembly's right here to take a position favoring childbirth over abortion, there are cases that allow them to do that. Again, they're not denying any kind of benefit to a patient seeking medical care because there are other entities, mostly public health departments, that provide these same —

THE COURT: The Plaintiff made note of Durham

County in particular for women health services where there

are some reasons why the services provided by Planned

Parenthood are more beneficial than those that could be

provided by the county to the extent that their — the hours are different, they work on the weekend, they have bilingual staff that's not available within the county, based upon what the representation is made to the Court. Is that a reason why the — certainly Planned Parenthood said it's being harmed in that way; but to the extent that the patients who are being denied those opportunities, are they being harmed as well to the extent the county does not provide those similar services?

MS. BULLOCK: Your Honor, I would state they are not being denied medical services. It may be more difficult for them to obtain them, but they are not being denied physical services.

As far as the claim that Plaintiff has as being entitled to the Title X funding, it is entitled to apply. They can apply. They can apply directly.

As far as the case of *Planned Parenthood versus Wichita* and in the Kansas -- most recent Kansas plaintiff -- Planned Parenthood lawsuit, again, it dealt with an existing contract that Planned Parenthood had terminated. That's not the case here.

So it is not a situation where North Carolina -- where the preliminary injunction that they're requesting would merely force them to abide by contractual obligations.

There is no contract. What this Court would be doing if you

issued a preliminary injunction at this point -- because they're asking more than stopping the enforcement of 10.19. They're asking you to make the State enter into a contract that they are not in now and to provide funding for them, which they're not required to do.

They have no entitlement to the funding at all. They do have an entitlement to apply for the funding, which they can do directly. And the status quo, as Your Honor indicated, is viewed differently here because, again, the budget bill passed in mid-June. The effective date was July 1st. The contract expired July 30th and their action was filed July the 7th. So the status quo was no contract, 10.19 is in effect.

THE COURT: What would the State do if the -- do with the funds if the Court did not enjoin it in this case?

MS. BULLOCK: My understanding is that those next in line that were part of the competitive bidding process would be allotted those funds.

THE COURT: So the funds are still available at this point?

MS. BULLOCK: As far as I know, Your Honor. There is a budget crisis as far as certain funds are involved, so I don't know the specifics on those.

Simply with the Bill of Attainder, there has been no punishment here, as far as the General Assembly is

concerned. This was a statute that was passed because the majority of the General Assembly favors childbirth over abortion.

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THE COURT: And were they always successful in

3 And as far as the Equal Protection Clause, the 4 5 Defendant Cansler maintains that their argument is justified; that they can support -- the General Assembly can 6 7 support this position, childbirth over abortion; that 10.19 8 was not designed to harm Planned Parenthood but to protect 9 and favor of childbirth over abortion. 10 Again, Planned Parenthood has no fundamental right to 11 Title X funding from the State and Planned Parenthood can 12 apply directly. It may be that the application deadline has 13 passed, as Your Honor indicated, but the ability to apply 14 directly has always been there. They chose not to do that. 15 And as far as the level of or the standard --16 THE COURT: How long have they been receiving it 17 from the State? Is there some pattern that's developed that 18 they were cooperating with the State and the State --19 MS. BULLOCK: They have to apply every year. They 20 are not quaranteed this money on a year-to-year basis. They 21 have to apply every year. 22 THE COURT: How many years have they applied 23 before this time? 24 MS. BULLOCK: I know more than five. 25

receiving the grant?

MS. BULLOCK: My understanding is that they have applied once in conjunction with the health department and they were not granted. So they have not always, 100 percent, but that's the only case.

As far as Planned Parenthood not being a member of the suspect class, the rational basis test applies; and as far as the rational basis test is concerned, an Equal Protection challenge to a government classification must be denied if there's any reasonable, conceivable stated facts that provide a rational basis for classification. So even if there may be differences of opinion on the wisdom, fairness, logic or legislative decision, if there is any basis — which here the basis would be that the legislature — majority of the legislature favors childbirth over abortion — then that would be a rational basis that could be the basis of the statute.

And, again, Planned Parenthood has no constitutional right to provide abortion services. Whatever rights it may have in connection with that are directly derived from a woman's right to abortion and nothing in 10.19 would prevent a woman from having an abortion. There is no undue burden that's been placed on the woman to obtain the abortion and there is no restriction on Planned Parenthood —

THE COURT: Is that directly before the Court,

though? You're talking a lot about the abortion issue, but 1 2 is that directly before the Court? 3 MS. BULLOCK: Planned Parenthood is using that, in my understanding, to say that they have a constitutional 4 5 right to these funds; and it would be the position of the Defendant that they do not have -- there is no fundamental 6 7 right at issue here because they're not suspect class and 8 they are not entitled. It's not a benefit that they're 9 entitled to. 10 THE COURT: They're saying they have the right to 11 express support for abortions through using other funds than 12 the funds here. Is that what their First Amendment right 13 is? 14 MS. BULLOCK: There's no restriction in 10.19 that 15 would prevent them from doing that. 16 THE COURT: But back to the question or statement 17 I made earlier. Is there any suggestion if you stop doing 18 abortions you can get funding? 19 MS. BULLOCK: They are the ones that are claiming 20 that because of the loss of 10.19 funds they're going to be having to lay off people and they're going to be --21 22 THE COURT: You're not answering my question. Is 23 there any suggestion here that you can get funding if you 24 stop supporting abortions by the implication of 10.19 or

what the legislative history may be?

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MS. BULLOCK: 10.19 does not make that statement,
no, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you want to address the legislative
history?

MS. BULLOCK: The legislative history that's been presented by the Plaintiffs, again, as I stated in my brief, it -- it is interesting, but it is an argument that --

THE COURT: Well, what does it say? What does Representative Stam or Senator Daniel say?

MS. BULLOCK: I'm not trying to deny any of the statements that the Plaintiff has made as far as statements of the legislators that were involved on the floor discussion, but what I'm saying is that their purpose in passing 10.19 not to fund Planned Parenthood is based on their position of favoring childbirth over abortion.

THE COURT: Anything further?

MS. BULLOCK: I would just state that as far as Eleventh Amendment immunity is concerned the real party at interest here is the State. And, again, what they're asking is more than stopping the effectiveness of 10.19. They're asking this Court to make the government — the State enter into a contract and provide funding to them when there is no contract in effect, and it would be the Defendant's position that that would obviously violate the State's sovereign immunity.

And as far as the balancing for the preliminary injunction test, the irreparable harm arguments that Plaintiff has made, I'm not going to deny, as nobody would, that the economy is bad and it was stated in the affidavit that Planned Parenthood has operated at a significant loss during the last fiscal year. People are being laid off everywhere, be that private industry or state government. Title X funding does not guarantee there will be no layoffs and Title X funds are not guaranteed to the Plaintiff.

As far as likelihood of harm to the Defendant if the relief is granted, the harm to the State, the real party in interest, the citizens of North Carolina, is that the preliminary injunction would force North Carolina to enter a contract to provide funding in opposition to properly adopted legislation; and the public interest favors — as far as whether or not the public interest favors granting the preliminary injunction, the citizens of North Carolina have elected the legislators that are now in the General Assembly and those citizens —

THE COURT: What would happen if the Court granted the Plaintiff's motion for injunction? You're saying what the legislature has done. What would they do and what would be the course of action if the Court grants the injunction?

MS. BULLOCK: Honestly, Your Honor, it -- I guess it would depend on how you phrased your preliminary

injunction -- your order granting the preliminary injunction. If you stopped the enforcement of 10.19 and said nothing further, then it would be up to DHHS as to whether or not they presented those remaining funds to the other delegates that had applied; but there would be a decision on the State making that decision, not a decision by this Court ordering them to enter into a contract that is not in existence at this time. And as far as the other entities that do have Title X funding, they do provide family planning services that Planned Parenthood has provided in the past.

And because of the arguments that I've given to the Court, we believe that Planned Parenthood is not likely to succeed on the merits of this case and Defendant Cansler would respectfully request that this Court not issue the preliminary injunction.

THE COURT: Thank you, ma'am.

Does Plaintiff wish to respond?

MR. WOLFSON: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And address first, if you will, the notion of the Court requiring the State upon an injunction, if it were to issue, to enter into a contract it has not entered into.

MR. WOLFSON: Right. So, Your Honor, as I said before and as I believe Ms. Bullock confirmed, the State was

prepared to -- was ready, willing, and able to enter into a contract with us. They tendered us the contract. We signed it. I think actually it may be under North Carolina law that I think they didn't have to countersign it, but I won't -- I don't think the Court needs to get into that. There is -- we won the competitive bidding process. The only reason that the contracts were not finalized and executed is because of 10.19. So, I mean, no other -- we have no other reason proffered today as to why --

THE COURT: So if that's the status quo, would the Court have to order health services to give you the money?

MR. WOLFSON: I don't think the Court would have to order that at this point, Your Honor. I think the Court -- if the Court enjoined the enforcement of 10.19, our expectation would be that the State would finalize the contracts with us because we already -- we already won the competitive -- the competitive bidding process.

So -- I mean, if they didn't -- you know, if the Court entered into an injunction and then there was some -- I'll use the term funny business -- I'll use that term colloquially -- where the State didn't do what it said it would do, we might want to come back to the Court. But our expectation if 10.19 were enjoined, the State would carry out its duties completely otherwise consistently with federal and state law and all contracting procedures

officers and whatnot; and we have no reason to doubt that the already executed contracts from our side would be finalized and put into place.

THE COURT: You understand, though, that would involve only the contract supposedly already in place -- and we're talking about the 2011-2012 period -- but it would not cover anything beyond that.

MR. WOLFSON: It would not cover '12 to '13, but if the State -- again, if 10.19 were enjoined, then presumably in the spring we would be free to apply again and the State would view our application in a completely neutral way, which is -- which they've always done in the past, and we have no reason to doubt that they wouldn't next year if 10.19 -- if the cloud of 10.19 is lifted. So all that we are really asking is the State treat us the way it has treated us all along, which is fairly; and it's only because 10.19 has come into the picture that they have not done so for -- have not done so now. I'm going to just -- so that I think is our key point on the state of the injunction.

On the -- on the issue of the merits, I just want to address one very significant point, which is this question of does Planned Parenthood have a constitutional right to funds. Of course there is no constitutional right to funds. There is a constitutional right not to have the government follow discriminatory or unconstitutional criteria in

determining who receives funds.

So the -- I would refer the Court to the key Supreme

Court case of *Perry versus Sindermann*, which is much

discussed in the briefs, where someone who was a faculty

member of a state college was seeking -- he was up for

tenure and he spoke out against the Board of Regents of the

university to the state legislature, perhaps not the wisest

career move. The Board of Regents -- the state college

swiftly retaliated against him by denying him tenure.

The argument was made, which is just directly analogous to the argument made here, the argument was made you have no constitutional right to tenure, you have no constitutional right to a government job, you have no constitutional -- you know, you didn't have tenure before. Because you didn't have tenure you have no legally protected right to have it renewed ad infinitum, just like we don't have a legally protected right to have our contract renewed ad infinitum.

But the Supreme Court said, "That's not the argument that has been made in this case. The argument that is being made in this case is that the government cannot use its power to award jobs or contracts, cannot exercise that in a way — in a discriminatory or unconstitutional way." And the Supreme Court I believe unanimously so held and that essentially is the principle that controls this case.

THE COURT: What the Defendant argued, as I

understood it, is where is the right in this case or the First Amendment right? Who has it? Planned Parenthood or the women who have the right to make a choice?

MR. WOLFSON: So there are two -- there's the First Amendment and then there is a Due Process Clause -- the constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy under the Due Process Clause. Planned Parenthood has a First Amendment right to speak of its own. In terms of the Due Process Clause, it is the woman's right to seek to terminate her pregnancy within the bounds that the Supreme Court has established. Of course, that right has to -- that service has to be provided to her by a medical provider, by a healthcare provider.

But many are the cases where the -- a challenge to abortion restrictions have been raised by the provider rather than by women potentially seeking to terminate their pregnancy and many of those cases have involved Planned Parenthood. And uniformly the Supreme Court has said, of course, Planned Parenthood has standing to raise the -- raise the constitutional rights of the women. It is directly harmed by the legislation because it is being -- its activities are being curtailed and it is the proper person to bring the case before the Court.

Yes, it is true, as Ms. Bullock pointed out, this statute does not directly say to Planned Parenthood, "You

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may not offer an abortion under such circumstances. You may not speak out in favor of choice." But also what -- that was also true in all of those cases where the Supreme Court has held that what is -- what the legislature is enacting is essentially a penalty for having done that in the past and an attempt to coerce you not to do it in the future. THE COURT: Any suggestion that you have not kept your funds separate from the nonabortion services and whatever abortion services you may provide? MR. WOLFSON: There is no such suggestion of which we are aware, Your Honor. The -- the State conducts an on-site review of our programs every year; and, of course, we are well aware of the requirement in Title X and under North Carolina law that we not use government funds for abortion; and those -- we adhere to those scrupulously; and no suggestion has been made that we have failed to do so. Thank you. THE COURT: Anything further you wish to add? MR. WOLFSON: No. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Anything further? MS. BULLOCK: Nothing, Your Honor. THE COURT: The Court will take into account your arguments you've made, will notify you shortly of its ruling

Anything further? Thank you very much. We'll be in

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recess until further notice.
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            (Proceedings concluded at 11:20 a.m.)
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<u>C E R I I F I C A I E</u>

I, LORI RUSSELL, RMR, CRR, United States District Court Reporter for the Middle District of North Carolina, DO HEREBY CERTIFY:

That the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the proceedings had in the within-entitled action; that I reported the same in stenotype to the best of my ability and thereafter reduced same to typewriting through the use of Computer-Aided Transcription.

Lori Russell, RMR, CRR Official Court Reporter Date 8-31-11