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              IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                  NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
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                          EASTERN DIVISION
   HELEN MONROE, Administrator of The estate of deceased,
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                                            No. 04 CV 7358
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                Plaintiff.
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                                            Chicago, Illinois
   VS.
                                            January 27, 2011
   UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and
   MELISSA GILLIAM,
                                            10:05 o'clock a.m.
                 Defendants.
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                    TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
             BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAMES B. ZAGEL
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   For the Plaintiff:
12
                 CORBOY & DEMETRIO
13
                 BY: Kenneth Thomas Lumb
                 33 North Dearborn Street
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                 Suite 2100
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                 Chicago, IL 60602
(312) 346-3191
16
   For Defendant Gilliam:
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                 HICKEY, MELIA & ASSOCIATES, CHTD.
                 BY: Brad Schneiderman
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                 77 West Washington Street,
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                 Suite 800
                 Chicago, Illinois 60602
(312) 422-9400
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   Court reporter:
22
                    Blanca I. Lara, CSR, RPR
219 South Dearborn Street
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                      Room 2504
Chicago, Illinois 60604
(312) 435-5895
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    Appearances (continued:)
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     For Defendant United States of America:
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                      United States Attorney's Office (NDIL)
BY: Gina Elizabeth Brock
219 South Dearborn Street
Suite 500
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                       Chicago, IL 60604 (312) 353-5300
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                  THE CLERK: 2004 C 7358, Monroe versus United
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          States.
                  MS. BROCK: Good morning, Your Honor.
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                  Gena Brock for the United States.
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                  THE COURT: We'll pass the case.
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:05AM
                  I will rule today.
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                  MS. BROCK: Okay. Thank you.
                  You're going to pass this up?
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                  THE COURT: Yeah; just briefly.
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               (Whereupon, the Court directed his
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               attention to other matters on his call,
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               after which the following further
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               proceedings were had herein:)
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:30AM
                  THE CLERK: 2004 C 7358, Monroe versus United
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          States.
                            Good morning, Judge.
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                  MS. BROCK:
                  Gena Brock for the United States.
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                  MR. LUMB: Kenneth Lumb on behalf of
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:30AM
          plaintiff.
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                  MR. SCHNEIDERMAN: Brad Schneiderman on
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          behalf of Dr. Gilliam, Your Honor. Sorry for being
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          late.
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                  THE COURT: The issue before me, which has
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1 been the subject of briefing and a hearing, is whether Dr. Gilliam is a federal employee for the purposes of the Tort Claims Act.

The contract does say that Dr. Gilliam is an independent contractor, which no one disputes.

Dr. Gilliam's position is is that the governmental is effectively estopped from making that assertion because she was, in fact, treated in all respects and controlled by the VA in all respects in a manner to render her an employee of the Veterans Administration for purposes of the Tort Claims Act.

It's the subject that comes up now and then, the Supreme Court addressed it. The law in question pretty much is the Restatement of Agency, the Restatement (Second) of Agency.

The Restatement (Second) of Agency lists a lot of factors, and it is the test. Although, "test" may be too strong a word to describe it because there are a fairly large number of factors to be considered and the Office to Restatement, and, for that matter, the courts of review have not actually told me which of those factors should be accorded which level of weight.

Essentially, there are two factors that I

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1 think are of no significance here, I mean the 2 factors are essentially neutral:

One is "the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision," this is a tie. It doesn't help me at all.

"Whether the principal is or is not in business," I think is not exactly appropriate in this kind of setting, but that, too, is essentially a neutral factor.

The factors that favor the government is "whether the person employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business." "The skill required in the particular occupation," that's also in favor of the government because Dr. Gilliam has such unique skill. "The length of time for which the person is employed," Dr. Gilliam did have a limited period of time for her employment. And "the method of payment" also favors the government because the payment was made by the Veterans Administration to the University of Illinois.

There is some slight weight in Dr. Gilliam's favor on the issue of whether or not the work is part of the regular business of the employer,

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1 because it was part of the regular business of the employer despite the fact that she served as a specialist or the unique skill requirement.

The instrumentalities, who supplied the instrumentalities at the place of work is a little in favor of Dr. Gilliam. She saw patients in two separate locations and the equipment was not hers, it was theirs, the VA had it. And, obviously, whether the individual was employed in a distinct occupation or business is in favor of the government, as well.

The two factors that I think are most important here are the extent of control the VA exercised over Dr. Gilliam and the belief of both parties whether they were in the relationship, to use the old language, of master and servant.

The master and servant factor, I think, was in favor of Dr. Gilliam. Whatever the contractual language said, she considered herself a VA employee, conducted herself accordingly. Dr. Wood viewed her as an employee. The VA's actions were consistent with the notion that it considered her an employee.

And the government, ordinarily in these cases--bearing in mind that this is a common occurrence, somebody shows up at the office and is

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1 contracted to do a specific bit of work, the line supervisor would usually treat the individual as though they were an employee--but, ordinarily, under these circumstances, the government has to take some effort to make sure that people understand and operate on the premise that this is an independent contractor.

The extent of control that the VA exercised over Dr. Gilliam, I think, is a single biggest factor here:

The VA basically determined when she showed up for work, how many hours she worked, where she worked, her professional appearance and practice, her attitude toward the customers, her attitude toward the bosses, and a control over outside employment.

The rules dictated her professional performance, her demeanor, her personal appearance, her hours of employment. She wore a lab jacket identifying her as a VA employee. She was expected to behave in a manner befitting a VA employee, and she was treated as a VA employee. She was not supervised by anybody at the University of Illinois in Chicago.

For these reasons, after considering

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1 carefully all the factors, I find that she was a 2 federal employee for the Tort Claims Act.

I can see that the specific contract may dictate that a person is a contractor even if everything else implies an employer/employee relationship. The VA did have a contract with the University of Illinois at Chicago where the University of Illinois agreed to provide the VA with a board certified gynecologist. The contract stated that the parties agreed that the contractor, it's employees, agents, and subcontractors, shall not be considered VA employees for any purpose.

Dr. Gilliam did, however, work at the VA prior to the VA's contracting with the University of Illinois Chicago for her services, and, to me, a significant factor here is that the contractual obligation was imposed on the University of Illinois after she began her employment, so I give that factor of little weight. My finding is that she was a federal employee for the purposes of the federal Tort Claims Act and we can proceed on that basis from here on out.

Now that I've said that we can proceed on this basis from here on out, I don't actually have a very clear idea of what proceeding has to be done

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         and you can tell me.
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                 MR. LUMB: Well, we would have to finish up
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          the subsequent physicians' depositions. I think the
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          ones that are still VA employees would be next. I
          know there's at least one, probably two or three, so
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:40AM
          perhaps we can probably schedule those and then come
          back on a short status.
                 THE COURT: When do you want to come back
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          here?
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                 MR. LUMB: Probably 60 days.
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:40AM
                 THE COURT: Mr. Walker, give them a couple of
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          months or a little more.
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                 THE CLERK: Your next date will be April 14th
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          at 10:00 a.m.
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                 MR. SCHNEIDERMAN: Your Honor, Brad
:40AM
          Schneiderman on behalf of Dr. Gilliam.
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                 will there be a written ruling?
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                 THE COURT: No, there will be an order.
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                 MR. SCHNEIDERMAN: Okay. I could get a
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          transcript.
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:40AM
                 THE COURT: Right. Exactly.
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                 MR. SCHNEIDERMAN: Okay. Thank you.
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                 MS. BROCK: Thank you, Your Honor.
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                 MR. LUMB: Thank you, Your Honor.
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           THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.
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        (Which concluded the proceedings had on
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         this date in the above entitled cause.)
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4 I CERTIFY THAT THE FOREGOING IS A CORRECT TRANSCRIPT
  FROM THE RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED
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                            MATTER
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     /s/Blanca I. Lara
                                             date
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           Blanca I. Lara
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                                              Date
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